Mob Control: Models of Threshold Collective Behavior by Vladimir V. Breer Dmitry A. Novikov & Andrey D. Rogatkin

Author:Vladimir V. Breer, Dmitry A. Novikov & Andrey D. Rogatkin
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham

(6.13)

where s i () ≥ 0 is an incentive paid by the Principal to agent i (i ∈ N). Generally, this incentive depends on the state vector (action profile) of all agents. Following [59, 74], the structure s() = {s i ()} i∈N will be termed the vector-form incentive function of the agents from the Principal. The dependence of the agents’ incentives on the action profile of all agents is a special case of the above payoff allocation mechanism.

Fix some set V of agents. Consider the following “institutional control” problem. Find the minimal vector-form incentive function (in the sense of the Principal’s total costs) that “excites” the given set V of agents as a Nash equilibrium (s(·)) in their game. Formally, this problem admits the following statement:

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